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Single-Family Zoning: Ramifications of
State Court Rejection of Belle Terre on Use
and Density Control
By Linda M. Grady*
The 1974 Supreme Court decision of Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas1 held constitutional a zoning ordinance in which "family"
was defined to permit an unlimited number of related persons to
reside together while allowing no more than two unrelated individ-
uals to do so.2 Since that decision, the supreme courts of New
Jersey' and California4 have invalidated similar restrictive defini-
tions of "family" on state constitutional grounds. While the Belle
Terre Court perceived the purpose of single-family zoning to be
the preservation of residential areas accommodating the needs and
values of the traditional related family and held an ordinance dis-
tinguishing between related and unrelated households to be a rea-
sonable means to effectuate this goal,6 the state courts have inter-
preted "family values" to specify a concept more aptly described
as a "family style of living,"'7 and the legitimate objective of single-
family zoning to be the preservation of the underlying characteris-
tics conducive to that lifestyle, such as low population density and
* B.A., 1972, University of California, Berkeley. Member, Second Year Class.
1. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
2. Id. at 2. See notes 49-54 & accompanying text infra.
3. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
4. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539
(1980).
5. 416 U.S. at 9.
6. Id.
7. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 133-34, 610 P.2d 436, 442,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 545 (1980).
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residential use.' From the state court perspective, an ordinance
based on consanguinity is unrelated to furthering these goals9 and,
according to the California Supreme Court, unnecessarily burdens
the privacy rights of unrelated individuals to choose their living
companions. 10
In striking down restrictive definitions of family, the Califor-
nia and New Jersey courts have proposed alternative methods of
achieving the aims of single-family zoning. The New Jersey courts,
in particular, strongly advocate that use of dwellings in single-fam-
ily zoned areas be restricted to bona fide single housekeeping units
and that density be controlled by standards based on the relation-
ship of habitable floor space to the number of occupants." The
California Supreme Court cited New Jersey's proposal as a reason-
able means of effectuating the goals of single-family zoning,12
thereby implying that the approach would be upheld under the
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review that is applied when a
statute affects an individual's fundamental right of privacy.'3 New
Jersey's approach therefore warrants careful consideration to de-
termine whether it in fact achieves the goals of single-family zon-
ing, complies with substantive due process requirements, and does
not infringe upon the privacy rights of individuals to choose their
living companions.
This Note first examines the development of single-family
zoning. The Note then explores the problems and viability of the
approach suggested by the New Jersey and California courts for
communities to utilize in achieving the objectives of single-family
8. Id. at 133, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
9. Id. at 132-33, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544; State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 106,
405 A.2d 368, 371-72 (1979).
10. 27 Cal. 3d at 131-34, 610 P.2d at 439-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542-45.
11. See text accompanying notes 130-46 infra.
12. 27 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 610 P.2d at 441-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
13. Under a traditional analysis of a statute's constitutionality, a court must defer to
the judgment of the legislature and uphold a statute as long as the means employed in
effectuating its purposes bear a rational relation to the state's interest. See Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Thus, a statute "will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). While the
traditional rational basis test continues to be applied in the area of economic regulation,
with respect to certain fundamental personal rights a strict scrutiny test has been devel-
oped. Under a strict scrutiny test, a statute will not be upheld unless it is shown that the
state interest is compelling or overriding, and that the means are precisely drawn to the
accomplishment of that end. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1966).
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zoning. The Note concludes that a carefully drafted definition of
the single housekeeping unit is a method that successfully may be
used to regulate the kind of use to which a single-family residence
is put, but that an occupant-to-area ratio is not a feasible means of
maintaining low-density. In advocating an occupant-to-area ratio
as a means of density control, these state courts have couched their
reasoning in terms of preventing overcrowding. Preventing over-
crowding and maintaining low population density are two discrete
goals. The Note suggests that the judiciary must recognize this dis-
tinction if the preservation of low-density districts is to remain a
viable zoning objective.
The Historical Development of Single-Family
Zoning
Zoning has been defined as the regulation "of the use of land
within the community as well as of the buildings and structures
which may be located thereon .... A relatively recent phe-
nomenon,1 5 the power of a municipality to zone comprehensively
was first given constitutional approval by the United States Su-
preme Court in the 1926 decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co."' The Court in Euclid held zoning ordinances to be a
valid exercise of a community's police power if they are substan-
tially related to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare.17 The Supreme Court further found that the establishment of
residential enclaves separated from commercial and industrial
14. 1 A. RATHKOFF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.01, at 1-1 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as RATHKoPF].
15. The first zoning ordinance in the United States was enacted by New York City in
1916. See RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 1.01, at 1-6. The text of that ordinance is reprinted in
full in J. MrZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 330 (1930) [hereinafter cited as METZENBAUM].
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The extent of the decision's impact is evident from the fact
that the case lent its name to the predominant system of zoning in the United States. "Eu-
clidean zoning" refers to the division of a municipality into districts coupled with an assign-
ment of particular uses to each district according to type and intensity, such as single-family
residential, multi-family residential, commercial, and heavy industrial. The system is theo-
retically hierarchical and cumulative. Thus, a single-family residence, the "highest" use of
land, can be located in a multifamily area, but a multifamily residence cannot be located in
a single-family district. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMRiCAN LAW OF PLANNING § 3.01, at 73 n.3 (2d
ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
17. 272 U.S. at 395. See also Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. Rav.
1427, 1443 (1978).
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areas was in fact related to the public welfare"8 and recognized the
need for single-family districts of low population density where
children might enjoy "the privilege of quiet and open spaces for
play. 19
Traditional single-family zoning essentially involves two inter-
related factors: low population density and restriction of use to
that of a residential family-style living arrangement. Density con-
trol traditionally has been justified as a valid objective of zoning
because of its relation to the public health.2 0 In fact, many of the
early zoning ordinances resulted from an awareness of health and
safety hazards inherent in the overcrowding of urban land.21 Den-
sity control of single-family districts historically has been effected
by prohibiting more intensive uses in the area, such as apartment
houses, as well as by regulating the bulk and size of buildings and
of the lots upon which they stand.2" Underlying this form of den-
sity control are the assumptions that a "family" will consist of the
traditional nuclear family and that the size of a building will deter-
mine the number of occupants therein.23 Using this technique, a
community in planning its development theoretically could deter-
mine and anticipate the population density of a particular area.
In contrast, the use of a dwelling in a single-family district tra-
ditionally has been regulated by defining "family" as an unlimited
number of individuals residing as a single housekeeping unit.24 Al-
18. 272 U.S. at 394.
19. Id.
20. See generally 1 ANDERSON, supra note 16, § 7.06, at 545-46; 2 N. WILLIAMS, AmiRi-
CAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 63.06, at 646-47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMs]. Addition-
ally, the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, recommended by the Department of Com-
merce in 1926 and subsequently adopted with variations by all 50 states, legitimized density
control as a permissible objective of zoning. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3,
reprinted in METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 304.
21. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 16, § 7.06, at 545-46.
22. 2 RATHKOFP, supra note 14, § 34.03, at 34-38.
23. 2 WILmiAMS, supra note 20, § 52.01, at 349. This assumption is also inferred from
many of the earliest definitions of "family," which did not distinguish between related and
unrelated individuals. See the ordinances cited in note 24 infra. It was not until the 1960's
brought a change in living patterns that communities redefined the term "family" in a re-
strictive manner, thereby acknowledging the fact that single-family residences will not nec-
essarily be inhabited by traditional families. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
24. The zoning ordinance at issue in Euclid defined family as "any number of individ-
uals living and cooking together on the premises as a single housekeeping unit." ZONING
ORDINANCE OF VILLAGE OF EUcLID, OHIO § 2(k), reprinted in MnTZENBAUM, supra note 15, at
338. Chicago's first zoning ordinance, adopted in 1923, as well as Cleveland's, adopted in
1929, had similar definitions of "family." METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 354-55, 392. See
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though the term "single housekeeping unit" has yet to be given a
precise and uniform definition, 5 courts have evaluated whether a
challenged group constitutes a single housekeeping unit by using
factors generally associated with a family lifestyle.26 Whether a
group cooks together,2 7 has access to the entire dwelling,28 or lives
in a relatively stable arrangement as opposed to a transient one
associated with a hotel or fraternity2 may be critical in determin-
ing whether the group constitutes a single housekeeping unit.
The state courts consistently have rejected arguments that the
term "single housekeeping unit" refers exclusively to occupancy by
related individuals. s° Generally, the rationale of the courts has
been couched in terms of legislative intent: If a municipality in-
tended to restrict occupancy of single-family dwellings to related
individuals, it was free to have so provided.31 Underlying this justi-
fication, however, was the implicit recognition that the single
housekeeping unit referred to the use to which a dwelling was put
rather than to the consanguinity of the occupants.3 2
Possibly in response to the emergence during the 1960's of
new lifestyles and living arrangements, 33 municipalities increas-
ingly redefined "family" in a more restrictive manner.3' The term
also 2 ANDERSON, supra note 16, § 9.30, at 169-70.
25. Generally, the concept connotes "use of the premises as a family, or in the manner
of a family." Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 78, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247 (1962).
26. See text accompanying notes 153-61 infra.
27. See Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951).
28. See Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962).
29. See Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1954).
30. Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962); Carroll v.
City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967); Missionaries of Our Lady of
La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 60 N.W.2d 627 (1954).
31. "Had it been the pleasure of the legislative body when defining the word 'family,'
to have excluded in the district any dwelling use of premises there situated, by a group of
individuals not related to one another by blood or marriage, it might have done so." Mis-
sionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 615, 66
N.W.2d 627, 630 (1954). "
32. This is most clearly evidenced in those cases involving ordinances that failed to
define "family." For example, a California appellate court refused to interpret the undefined
term to mean a household related by consanguinity or affinity, stating it was beyond the
court's authority to do so. However, the court did not hesitate then to define "family" as a
group of persons, related or unrelated, living as a single housekeeping unit in the "manner
of a family." Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 78, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247-48
(1962). Yet, evidence of legislative intent supporting this interpretation was just as negligi-
ble as that sustaining a more restrictive definition of family.
33. See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 16, § 9.30, at 170.
34. See, e.g., Prospect Gardens Convalescent Home, Inc. v. City of Norwalk, 32 Conn.
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typically was defined as an unlimited number of individuals re-
lated by blood, marriage, or adoption, but only a limited number of
unrelated individuals living together as a single housekeeping
unit.3 5 In some instances, the definition excluded unrelated house-
holds entirely.36 With the enactment of regulations expressly dis-
tinguishing between related and unrelated groups, the state courts
were forced to deal directly with issues that previously were
avoided under the rationale of "legislative intent" and to examine
the implicit presumption that zoning's function and purpose lies in
regulating land use rather than household composition.
Prior to the 1974 Supreme Court decision in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,3 restrictive definitions of family generally were
rejected by the state courts., 8 The rationale for the disapproval of
restrictive definitions of family is found in the manner in which
these courts defined the purposes of single-family zoning. For ex-
ample, the Illinois Supreme Court perceived the objectives of sin-
gle-family zoning to be the preservation of stable low density areas
with a minimum of traffic and congestion. 9 The court observed
that a zoning ordinance limiting the use of single-family dwellings
Supp. 214, 217, 347 A.2d 637, 639 (1975). A 1974 amendment to § 118-1 of Norwalk's zoning
ordinance changed the definition of "family" from "single-housekeeping unit" to "[o]ne (1)
or more persons occupying a single dwelling unit, provided that unless all members are re-
lated by blood or marriage (or adoption), no such family shall contain more than five (5)
persons." Id. at 217, 347 A.2d at 639. See also Town of Durham v. White Enterprises, Inc.,
155 N.H. 645, 648, 348 A.2d 706, 708 (1975). This is not to say that restrictive definitions of
"family" did not exist prior to this time. See, e.g., Kellog v. Joint Council of Women's Auxil-
iaries Welfare Ass'n, 265 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. 1954).
35. See, e.g., the ordinances cited in notes 34 supra and 84 infra.
36. The City of Des Plaines ordinance, cited in City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 IlL
2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116, 117 (1966), provided: "A 'family' consists of one or more persons
each related to the other by blood (or adoption or marriage), together with such relatives'
respective spouses, who are living together in a single dwelling and maintaining a common
household."
37. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
38. See, e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 M11. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966);
Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971). Contra,
Kellog v. Joint Council of Women's Auxiliaries Welfare Ass'n, 265 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. 1954).
Generally, the lower state courts also invalidated restrictive definitions of family. See, e.g.,
Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (1970). Contra,
City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (1961) (overruled by statute,
N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, § 55-33.2 (West 1962)).
39. See City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 437, 216 N.E.2d 116, 119 (1966).
Trottner involved four unrelated men residing together in a single-family dwelling in viola-




to members of related families did little to further these objectives:
[A] group of persons bound together only by their common desire
to operate a single housekeeping unit, might be thought to have a
transient quality that would affect adversely the stability of the
neighborhood.... An ordinance requiring relationship by blood,
marriage or adoption could be regarded as tending to limit the
intensity of land use. And it might be considered that a group of
unrelated persons would be more likely to generate traffic and
parking problems than would an equal number of related persons.
But none of these observations reflects a universal truth.
Family groups are mobile today, and not all family units are in-
ternally stable and well-disciplined. Family groups with two or
more cars are not unfamiliar. And so far as intensity of use is
concerned, the [present] definition... can hardly be regarded as
an effective control upon the size of family units.40
The Illinois court cautiously chose to invalidate the regulation
on the basis that the municipality had exceeded its zoning author-
ity as delegated to it by the state legislature.4 1 A subsequent New
Jersey decision 2 went one step further in holding a similar ordi-
nance to be in violation of the constitutional requirements of sub-
stantive due process.4 s The controversy in New Jersey centered on
a restrictive definition of "family"" that a seaside resort commu-
nity had adopted to prevent large groups of "unruly" young people
from renting dwellings on a seasonal basis.45 The court acknowl-
40. 34 Ill. 2d at 437-38, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
41. Id. at 438, 216 N.E.2d at 120. General law cities have no inherent police powers,
but derive their authority from the state. A municipality may not exceed the authority
delegated to it by the state. See 2 E. McQumLAN, THE LAW OF MumIc'AL CoRPoRATIONS,
§§ 4.04, 10.18a, at 12-13, 790 (3d ed. 1979). As a result of the Trottner decision, the Illinois
Legislature revised the zoning enabling act to provide: "[T]he corporate authorities in each
municipality have the following powers:... (9) to classify, to regulate and restrict the use
of property on the basis of family relationship, which family relationship may be defined as
one or more persons each related to the other by blood, marriage or adoption and maintain-
ing a common household." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1(9) (Smith-Hurd 1971).
42. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
Kirsch represents the first articulation of the constitutional issues involved in restrictive
definitions of "family" on a state supreme court level. The problems previously were identi-
fied in the New Jersey lower court decision of Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate
City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (1970).
43. The court did not specify whether it rested its holding on state or federal due
process guarantees. As the decision predates Belle Terre, however, the distinction was not
yet important. See notes 49-57 & accompanying text infra.
44. The ordinance at issue defined "family" as either a related group living as a single
housekeeping unit or as a group of unrelated individuals "whose association is [not] tempo-
rary and resort-seasonal in character or nature." 59 N.J. at 247, 281 A.2d at 516.
45. Id. at 248, 281 A.2d at 515.
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edged that the community has a legitimate objective in its desire
to prevent overcrowding and "obnoxious personal behavior." 46
However, a zoning ordinance limiting seasonal occupancy to re-
lated individuals "preclude[s] so many harmless dwelling uses"
that do not contribute to the problem sought to be terminated that
it must be considered "sweepingly excessive." 4 The court thus
found the regulation to be unreasonable and without a substantial
relation to its intended objective.4 8 As in the earlier cases concern-
ing "single housekeeping units," the court's focus was on the kind
of use to which a dwelling is placed and the compatibility of such
use with the character of the district.
Belle Terre and Moore
The United States Supreme Court decision in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas49 added a new dimension to the concept of single-
family zoning-and a new basis for conflict. Belle Terre concerned
several unrelated college students who lived together in a single-
family dwelling despite a village ordinance prohibiting more than
two unrelated individuals from so residing.50 Upon being served
with a notice of violation, three of the students and the owners of
the property filed a'civil rights action challenging the constitution-
ality of the ordinance. Among other contentions, the plaintiffs as-
serted that the regulation infringed upon their rights of privacy,
association, and travel. The majority, speaking through Justice
Douglas, quickly rejected the arguments that fundamental rights
had been violated.51 Rather, the ordinance was found to be a form
of socioeconomic legislation; thus, the proper test to determine the
validity of the ordinance was whether it was reasonable and ration-
ally related to a permissible state objective.52 The Court delineated
the permissible state objective to be "a land-use project addressed
46. Id. at 253, 281 A.2d at 520.
47. Id. at 251-52, 281 A.2d at 518-19.
48. Id.
49. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
50. "The word 'family' as used in the ordinance means, '[o]ne or more persons related
by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking.together as a single housekeeping unit,
exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or
marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.'" Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 8.
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to family needs. . .[and] values; '5' therefore, an ordinance differ-
entiating between related and unrelated households furthered a le-
gitimate legislative objective and was valid."
Belle Terre represented a radical departure from prior state
court decisions. 55 Whereas state courts consistently perceived the
purpose of single-family zoning in terms of the characteristics asso-
ciated with such environments,56 the Belle Terre Court regarded
the purpose of single-family zoning as the preservation of residen-
tial enclaves designed specifically for habitation by traditional
families.57 The state courts reasoned that only an ordinance regu-
lating the use of the dwelling could be considered rationally related
to the state's objective; Belle Terre held that an ordinance dictat-
ing the kinship of a household is a reasonable means to achieve a
state's zoning objective and therefore satisfies the demands of sub-
stantive due process.
Belle Terre's newly articulated objective of single-family zon-
ing, the promotion of "family needs," was strengthened by the
Court's subsequent decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 8
In Moore, a city ordinance defined "family" so restrictively that in
effect only a nuclear family was permitted to reside in a single-
family dwelling.59 Mrs. Moore lived in her home with her grand-
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. In so holding, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision invali-
dating the regulation. The Second Circuit had found that the community's goal of protect-
ing the traditional family pattern of occupancy of single-family dwellings by those related
through blood or legal affinity to be beyond the scope of the police power as it would ex-
clude unrelated households without any rational basis. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476
F.2d 806, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1973). The District Court for the Northern District of California
-viewed police power in a broader fashion, holding that the state has a "clear interest in
preserving the integrity of the biological and/or legal family" and that restrictive definitions
of "family" were a rational means to achieve that goal. See Palo Alto Tenants' Union v.
Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
55. The Belle Terre holding is particularly startling because it represents the first Su-
preme Court decision directly reviewing the substance of a zoning ordinance in almost 50
years. As a result, the development of zoning law occurred on the state court level. Yet,
neither the Belle Terre decision nor the subsequent plurality opinion in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), referred to any state court holdings in this area. Only
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Moore, took note of the state court decisions.
431 U.S. at 515-20 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. See notes 26-29 & accompanying text supra.
57. 416 U.S. at 9.
58. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
59. EAsT CLEVELAND, Omo, HousmI CODE § 1341.08 (1966), cited in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 n.2 (1977), provided: "'Family' means a number of indi-
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sons. Because her grandsons were cousins rather than brothers, the
arrangement violated the ordinance and Mrs. Moore was fined and
sentenced to jail.60 In a five to four decision,61 the Court held that
the ordinance failed to meet the requirements of substantive due
process. The plurality opinion 2 acknowledged that "the family is
not beyond regulation."6 However, a regulation affecting family
living arrangements burdens the "long recognized.., freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life [that] is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment,"" and must therefore be carefully considered.
The Court found that an ordinance establishing classifications of
related groups did little to further a city's legitimate goals of con-
trolling overcrowding, traffic, or congestion, and was therefore an
unreasonable means to effectuate these goals.6 5
This observation would seem to undermine the strength of
Belle Terre in that the same reasoning seems equally applicable to
viduals related to the nominal head of the household or to the spouse of the nominal head
of the household living as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to
the following: (a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household. (b) Unmarried
children of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the
household, provided, however, that such unmarried children have no children residing with
them. (c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the
nominal head of the household. (d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof,
a family may include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nomi-
nal head of the household or the spouse of the nominal head of the household and spouse
and dependent children of such dependent child. For the purpose of this subsection, a de-
pendent person is one who has more than fifty percent of his total support furnished for him
by the nominal head of the household and the spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual."
60. 431 U.S. at 497.
61. Two concurring opinions and three separate dissents were published in Moore.
62. Justice Stevens would have invalidated the ordinance as unconstitutionally inter-
fering with a person's right to use his or her property as he or she sees fit, thus constituting
a taking without due process and compensation. Id. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 499.
64. Id. (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
65. 431 U.S. at 500. Although the Court apparently evaluated the ordinance using the
rational basis test, the language of the opinion intimates that a community may need to
show an interest stronger than that required by the rational basis test to justify a regulation
that impacts upon family choice of living arrangements. The ambiguity of the language,
coupled with the Court's reliance on the major privacy cases, has led several commentators
to suggest that Moore essentially extends the fundamental rights of privacy and association
to such choices. See, e.g., Jensen, From Belle Terre to East Cleveland: Zoning, the Family
and the Right of Privacy, 13 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1979); Note, The Collision of Zoning Ordinances
and the Constitutional Rights of Privacy and Association: Critique and Prognosis, 30 CAsE
W. REs. L. Rxv. 155 (1979).
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an ordinance distinguishing between related and unrelated house-
holds.6 6 However, both the plurality opinion" and the concurring
opinion of Justices Marshall and Brennan68 cited Belle Terre in
support of Moore's holding. The ordinance in Belle Terre in no
way inhibited the choice of related individuals to live together.
Rather, it simply barred unrelated individuals from constituting a
household in a single-family zone.69 As such, the regulation served
to encourage and protect "family needs. '70 East Cleveland's regu-
lation, on the other hand, "slice[d] deeply into the family itself,"
thereby circumventing the essential purposes of single-family
zoning.7 1
Belle Terre rejected contentions that unrelated individuals
have a constitutionally protected right to choose their living com-
panions and place of residence. Moore, on the other hand, ex-
tended constitutional protection to the living arrangements of the
extended family.72 In light of Belle Terre and Moore, federal con-
stitutional law apparently allows zoning authorities to distinguish
related households from unrelated ones,73 but prohibits any regula-
tion that will affect the choice of related individuals to reside to-
gether.7 ' Moore, therefore, underscores and sustains Belle Terre's
formulation that the objective of single-family zoning is to protect
and encourage the institution of the traditional family.
Baker and Adamson: State Court Rejection of Belle
Terre
Belle Terre has been widely and justifiably criticized.7 5 By es-
tablishing "family needs" as a permissible goal of single-family
66. See State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 111, 405 A.2d 368, 374 (1979).
67. 431 U.S. at 498.
68. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. See id.
70. See generally Note, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio: The Emergence of the
Right of Family Choice in Zoning, 5 PFPPaniNE L. REV. 547, 565-68 (1978).
71. 431 U.S. at 498.
72. See Note, Constitutionally Protected Notions of Family: Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 19 B.C.L. REv. 959 (1978).
73. Belle Terre's ordinance did allow two unrelated individuals to reside together. It is
questionable whether an ordinance expressly prohibiting two unrelated persons from resid-
ing together would withstand judicial scrutiny.
74. See 4 RATHKOPF, supra note 14, at 252 (Supp. 1979).
75. See, e.g., L. TtmE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrTUoNAL LAW, §§ 15-18, at 975-80 (1978);
Williams & Doughty, Studies in Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 73 (1975).
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zoning, the Court has permitted zoning to reach beyond the regula-
tion of land use and enter the realm of social control.7' Judicial
approval has been provided for a community to exclude living ar-
rangements it deems objectionable without consideration of the
household's effect on the character, population density, or traffic
level of the district."
Belle Terre has not been universally followed by state courts.
While at least three state supreme courts have accepted zoning for
the needs of the traditional family as legitimate, 8 three other state
courts have refused to restrict the occupancy of residences located
in single-family zoned districts to related households. 9 Of these,
New Jersey" and, more recently, California s have expressly invali-
76. See Note, The Collision of Zoning Ordinances and the Constitutional Rights of
Privacy and Association, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 155, 167 (1979). Zoning as a form of social
control is not a new phenomenon. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50
(1976). In Young, the Court upheld a city ordinance regulating the location of theaters
showing pornographic films. This is justified, the Court held, by the city's interest in pre-
serving the character of its neighborhoods. Id. at 71. A concentration of pornographic thea-
ters causes an area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects, the Court noted, that
are not attributable to other types of theaters. Id. at 71 n.34. Arguably, however, there is a
qualitative difference between a control of this kind which visibly affects the community
and one that affects intimate personal choices.
77. In one recent case, two married couples jointly purchased a single-family residence
because neither couple could afford to buy a residence independently. The two couples,
along with an unmarried couple, lived as a communal family in violation of the city's restric-
tive definition of family. Relying extensively on Belle Terre, the Colorado Supreme Court,
in a short conclusory opinion, upheld the local ordinance. Rademan v. City and County of
Denver, 186 Colo. 250, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974). Considering the current cost of housing, see
note 128 infra, joint ownership of property may be the only feasible means many individuals
may have to purchase single-family dwellings. In view of such economic considerations, the
Colorado court's holding illustrates the type of abuse to which Belle Terre lends itself.
78. See Rademan v. City and County of Denver, 186 Colo. 250, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974);
Town of Durham v. White Enterprises, Inc., 115 N.H. 645, 348 A.2d 706 (1975); Ass'n for
Educ. Dev. v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. 1976). Additionally, a lower Connecticut court
cited Belle Terre with approval in holding that a group of unrelated individuals did not
constitute a family. Prospect Gardens Convalescent Home, Inc. v. City of Norwalk, 32 Conn.
Supp. 214, 347 A.2d 637 (1975).
79. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 539 (1980); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979); City of White Plains v.
Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974). In Crowley v. Knapp, 94
Wis. 2d 42, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980), the term "family" was not defined in the restrictive
covenant at issue. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to interpret the term to
refer solely to related groups of individuals, resting its holding on the traditional rationale of
"public policy favor[ing] the free and unrestricted use of property." Id. at 434, 288 N.W.2d
at 822. Belle Terre arguably provides sufficient authority to find otherwise had the court
been so inclined; thus the decision indicates that this court also may be receptive to striking
down restrictive definitions of "family" in zoning ordinances.
80. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
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dated restrictive definitions of "family" on state constitutional
grounds.8 2
The leading New Jersey case of State v. Bakers$ concerned a
woman and her three children who lived in a single-family dwelling
along with a married couple and their three children in violation of
an ordinance prohibiting more than four unrelated individuals
from residing together.8 The New Jersey Supreme Court reiter-
ated and expounded upon the substantive due process objections
articulated in the pre-Belle Terre cases,85 noting in particular that
classifications based on biological or legal relationships "operate to
prohibit a plethora of uses which pose no threat to the accomplish-
ment of the end sought to be achieved."8 " The court approved of
the Illinois Supreme Court's observation 7 that ordinances distin-
guishing between related and unrelated households were grounded
on invalid and generalized assumptions regarding the characteris-
tics of each type of living arrangement and the effect of the respec-
tive arrangements on the legitimate goal of maintaining a family
style of living in a residential neighborhood.88 Enactment of a zon-
ing ordinance that essentially "regulate[s] the internal composition
of housekeeping units,"8 9 therefore, was held to constitute an un-
reasonable exercise of municipal zoning power, as it did not "bear
a real or substantial relation to a legitimate municipal goal."' 0
The California Supreme Court also has rejected Belle Terre,
holding that zoning ordinances that distinguish between related
81. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539
(1980).
82. Belle Terre is the current interpretation of federal constitutional law. State courts
remain free to interpret their own state constitutions less restrictively, as Justice Brennan
emphasizes in a recent article. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HAtv. L. Rav. 489 (1977).
83. 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
84. Section 17:3-1(a)(17) of the Crry OF PLAINFIELD ZONING ORDINANCE, cited in State
v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 103-04, 405 A.2d 368, 370 (1979), defined the term "family" as: "One
(1) or more persons occupying a dwelling unit as a single non-profit housekeeping unit.
More than four (4) persons . . .not related by blood, marriage or adoption shall not be
considered to constitute a family."
85. See notes 42-48 & accompanying text supra.
86. 81 N.J. at 107, 405 A.2d at 371.
87. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
88. 81 N.J. at 108-09, 405 A.2d at 372.
89. Id. at 106, 405 A.2d at 371.
90. Id. at 105, 405 A.2d at 371. See generally Note, Zoning According to Biological or
Legal Relationships is Violative of the New Jersey Constitution, 11 SETON HALL L. REV.
112 (1980).
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and unrelated groups violate the fundamental right of privacy, a
right specifically guaranteed by the California Constitution. 1 In
City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson,9 2 Ms. Adamson lived in her
large ten bedroom home along with eleven other individuals, none
of whom were related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Santa Bar-
bara's definition of "family" prohibited more than five unrelated
persons from living together.93 The California Supreme Court
found the prohibition to violate the privacy rights of unrelated in-
dividuals to choose their living companions.9 ' In evaluating the
ordinance, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard necessi-
tating that the city show a compelling state interest to justify bur-
dening the fundamental rights of members of unrelated house-
holds.9 5 Santa Barbara failed to meet this exacting standard.96 The
majority found that the classification distinguishing between re-
lated and unrelated individuals did little to promote the factors
that gave a residential family neighborhood its unique characteris-
tics. 17 Stability and peacefulness are not necessarily inherent in
modern family gr6ups, nor are transience and disorderliness neces-
sarily characteristic of unrelated groups. Restricting households
consisting of unrelated individuals to a specified number of per-
sons while imposing no such ceiling on households formed by re-
lated individuals thus rationally does little to limit population den-
sity or combat the problems of traffic and congestion. 8
Adamson represents the first state court decision to invalidate
this type of zoning ordinance on a fundamental rights theory.99 In
91. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protect-
ing property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CoNST. art. I,
§ 1.
92. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
93. Section 28.04.230 of Santa Barbara's zoning ordinance, cited in City of Santa Bar-
bara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 127, 610 P.2d 436, 437-38, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540-41
(1980), provided: "Family. 1. An individual, or two (2) or more persons related by blood,
marriage or legal adoption living together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling
unit .... 2. A group of not to exceed five (5) persons, excluding servants, living together as
a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit."
94. Id. at 130-34, 610 P.2d at 439-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542-45.
95. Id. at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
96. Id. at 134, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
97. Id. at 132-33, 610 P.2d at 440-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
98. Id.
99. The Baker court, in dictum and in a footnote, observed that the ordinance in
question violated the privacy of unrelated individuals, but the holding rested squarely on
substantive due process grounds. 81 N.J. at 109, 114 n.10, 405 A.2d at 372, 375.
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so doing, California has departed from the traditional deference
that courts since Euclid100 have afforded communities in zoning
matters'0
1
In light of the Adamson court's reasoning, it was unnecessary
to invalidate the ordinance on a fundamental rights ground.10 2 The
reasons used to show the lack of a compelling state interest would
have supported invalidation had the less strict substantive due
process standard been applied as in the New Jersey case. 03
The right to privacy in California, however, is in an embryonic
stage of development. It was only in 1972 that the voters amended
the state constitution expressly to guarantee the right of privacy,""
and prior to Adamson, the state's supreme court had decided only
two privacy cases based on the amendment. 0 5 Both of those cases
unequivocally interpreted the intent underlying the privacy
amendment, as expressed by the proponents' argument in the elec-
toral pamphlet, to be the curtailing of information gathering activi-
ties by the government. 06 Yet in Adamson, the court departed
100. "If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debat-
able, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924)). See also
Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949).
101. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). See generally Margolis, Exclusionary Zoning: For Whom Does Belle Terre Toll?, 11
CAL. W.L. REV. 85, 92-98 (1974).
102. See note 13 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 83-90 supra.
104. See note 91 supra.
105. See People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979);
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
106. "Although the general concept of privacy relates ... to an enormously broad and
diverse field of personal action and belief, the moving force behind the new constitutional
provision was a more focused privacy concern, relating to the accelerating encroachment on
personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection activity
in contemporary society. The new provision's primary purpose is to afford individuals some
measure of protection against this most modern threat to personal privacy." White v. Davis,
13 Cal. 3d 757, 773-74, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
After delineating the intent underlying the passage of the privacy amendment, the court in
White held that it was a violation of privacy for police officers to pose as students at a
university. Id. at 776, 533 P.2d at 234-35, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07. In People v. Privitera, 23
Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979), the court rejected the contention that a
state law prohibiting the use of laetrile constituted an invasion of privacy, again emphasiz-
ing that the intent of the amendment was to curtail information gathering activities by the
government, and that "[i]n the absence of any evidence that the voters in amending the
California Constitution to create a right of privacy intended to protect [the use of laetrile],
we have no hesitation in holding that its prohibition does not offend that constitutional
provision." Id. at 709-10, 591 P.2d at 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
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from its prior reasoning to interpret the voter's intent as also en-
compassing the right of unrelated individuals to determine their
living companions.' ° This interpretation was based on several
statements in the voter's pamphlet.108 When these statements are
read in context, however, little support is provided for the Adam-
son majority's conclusion that the amendment was intended to ex-
tend the protection of privacy to zoning matters in general, and to
the choice of individuals to form associational families specifi-
cally,10 9 a point emphasized by the dissent.110 The court perhaps
regarded Adamson not so much as a zoning question but as an op-
portunity to delineate further the parameters of the privacy right
in California. As such, the decision may prove to be of little prece-
dential value with respect to single-family zoning issues in other
jurisdictions, particularly in those lacking an express constitutional
guarantee of privacy.11
The essential difference between Belle Terre and those cases
107. 27 Cal. 3d at 130, 610 P.2d at 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
108. "The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and com-
pelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expres-
sions, our personalities, our freedom of communion and our freedom to associate with the
people we choose." Id. (emphasis added by the court).
109. The section of the voter's pamphlet quoted by the court stated: "The prolifera-
tion of government snooping and data collecting is threatening to destroy our traditional
freedoms. Government agencies seem to be competing to compile the most extensive sets of
dossiers of American citizens. Computerization of records makes it possible to create 'cradle-
to-grave' profiles on every American.
"At present there are no effective restraints on the information activities of government
and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every
Californian.
"The right of privacy is the right to be let alone. It is a fundamental and compelling
interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions,
our personalities, our freedom of communion and our freedom to associate with the people
we choose. It prevents government and business interests from collecting and stockpiling
unnecessary information about us and from misusing information gathered for one purpose
in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us." Proposed Amendments to Constitu-
tion, Proposition and Proposed Laws Together with Arguments 26-27 (Nov. 7, 1972) (com-
piled by George H. Murphy, Legislative Counsel, State of California) (emphasis in original).
When the section is read as a whole, it is obvious that the amendment was proposed to
protect individuals from government intelligence gathering, as the California Supreme Court
stated in White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
110. 27 Cal. 3d at 143, 610 P.2d at 447-48, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51 (Manuel, J.,
dissenting).
111. The only state other than California that expressly guarantees the right of pri-
vacy in its constitution is Alaska. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22. Alaska's Supreme Court has
held that the citizens of Alaska have a basic right to privacy in their homes. Ravin v. State,
537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
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rejecting it seems to rest on the defined purposes of single-family
zoning. The Supreme Court in Belle Terre envisioned single-family
districts for use exclusively by traditional families. 2 In contrast,
courts in California, New Jersey, and similar jurisdictions1 s per-
ceive these residential areas to be designed for use more aptly de-
scribed as a "family style of living.1 1 14 Such courts emphasize the
qualities generally evoked by the phrase and view the preservation
of stable, uncongested residential areas of low population density
as a legitimate goal of single-family zoning.1 5 From this perspec-
tive, it is irrational to focus on the biological or legal relationship
among the users because neither consanguinity nor affinity neces-
sarily guarantees stability, few cars, or low population density.1
Rather, it is the kind of use to which a dwelling is put, and the
number of users, whether related or unrelated, that is important.
Use and Density: The Problems Faced by
Communities in States Rejecting Belle Terre
Municipalities located in jurisdictions declining to follow Belle
Terre are faced with the challenge of devising ordinances that will
preserve successfully the unique characteristics of single-family
zoning without infringing upon the constitutional rights of the resi-
dents.1 7 Essentially, the problem is twofold. First, the ordinance
must ensure that the kind of use to which a dwelling is put is com-
patible with the residential characteristics of the single-family
zoned area. Second, and more importantly, the issue of density
control must be addressed.
Low population density is the essence of single-family zoning,
112. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
113. E.g., City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
114. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 133-34, 610 P.2d 436,
442, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 545 (1980).
115. "Local governments are free to designate certain areas as exclusively residential
and may act to preserve a family style of living. A municipality is validly concerned with
maintaining the stability and permanence generally associated with single family occupancy.
S.. [A] municipality has a strong interest in regulating the intensity of land use so as to
minimize congestion and overcrowding." State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 106, 405 A.2d 368, 371
(1979) (citations omitted).
116. See text accompanying notes 38-39, 80-83 supra.
117. At least 37 California communities had restrictive definitions of "family" at the
time the decision was rendered. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 138 n.1,
610 P.2d 436, 444, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 547 (1980) (Manuel, J., dissenting).
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the characteristic that distinguishes it from other types of residen-
tial zoning. Municipalities long have had the unquestioned author-
ity to establish classifications of residential districts based on in-
tensity of use118 and to exclude multifamily residences and
apartment houses from areas comprised of single-family dwell-
ings.119 The traditional rationale for this authority was first ex-
pressed by the Euclid Court, which reasoned that the increased
noise, traffic, and congestion resulting from high density land use
would pose serious dangers to children and possibly destroy the
residential character of the neighborhood. 120
As noted previously, 121 traditional density control techniques
relied on the assumption that dwellings in single-family districts
would be inhabited by the traditional family and that the number
of occupants in each dwelling therefore could be theoretically an-
ticipated. From this perspective, restrictive definitions of family
merely provide an additional means of regulating density by ensur-
ing that associational families remain more or less within the nu-
merical limits of traditional families. 22 The state courts invalidat-
ing restrictive definitions of family have refused to accept this
argument, however, reasoning that such definitions will not limit
the number of residents in a related household and therefore will
do little to control density successfully. 23 Yet, recent census
figures indicate that during the past twenty years, the average re-
lated household has been composed of less than four persons, and
that the number has been steadily decreasing. 2 4 The ordinances at
issue in both the Adamson and the Baker cases, however, estab-
lished ceilings on the number of occupants in unrelated households
in excess of these figures.125 Taken together, these facts undermine
judicial objections to restrictive definitions of family as a form of
118. See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 16, § 9.24, at 151-52.
119. Id. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
120. 272 U.S. at 394.
121. See notes 20-23 & accompanying text supra.
122. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 138, 610 P.2d 436, 445,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 548 (1980) (Manuel, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 132, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544; State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 110,
405 A.2d 368, 373 (1979).
124. Preliminary results from the 1980 census indicate that the average related house-
hold is composed of 3.28 persons; in 1970, the figure was 3.58; and in 1960, the figure was
3.67. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES BY TYPE, Series
P-20, No. 357 (Oct. 1980).
125. See notes 84, 93 supra.
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density control as the definitions allow a density greater than that
in the average family. 12 6
This argument does not suggest that the courts were mistaken
in invalidating restrictive definitions of family. Standing alone,
such definitions present too many opportunities for potential abuse
to justify their use as a means of density control. Furthermore, in
the present era of double digit inflation 127 and skyrocketing hous-
ing prices, 28 it is not unlikely that more unrelated people will form
households simply to be able to afford the cost of a dwelling in a
residential area. As long as the use of a dwelling by an unrelated
household of reasonable size is compatible with the character of
the district and the infrastructure of the community is not over-
taxed, there is insufficient justification to warrant intrusion into
the choice of individuals to reside together.
However, the ramifications of density control extend beyond
the single family district to land use planning in general. Regula-
tion of density is crucial for developing communities with limited
sewage, water, or other essential systems and services. 29 Without a
means of regulating the number of occupants in a residence, the
assumptions upon which the traditional means of controlling den-
sity depend are undermined, thereby affecting the efficacy of the
techniques themselves. Traditional density limitations, such as re-
strictions on lot or building size, may not alone serve to limit the
number of occupants as effectively as when coupled with a regula-
tion directly affecting the permissible number of residents, such as
a restrictive definition of family. A developing community that has
planned its expansion using traditional techniques can no longer
be assured that its public facilities will not be overtaxed by associ-
ational families of greater size than the average related household.
126. See Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974). Of course,
this reasoning is not applicable to ordinances that define "family" as less than four un-
related persons.
127. The Bureau of Labor Statistics recently reported that inflation rose by 12.4% in
1980. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 24, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
128. According to a study by the Bay Area Council, the average single-family resi-
dence in the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area now costs $109,000, as compared to be-
tween $25,000 and $30,000 in 1970. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 6, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
129. See City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738
(1981).
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The New Jersey Approach
The New Jersey courts have been the most active forum' for
litigating restrictive definitions of "family" and have developed a
twofold approach to the dilemma faced by communities in zoning
for single-family residential areas, an approach that the Adamson
court apparently agrees is the most reasonable solution to the
problem.3 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court has recommended
that use of single-family dwellings be restricted to bona fide single
housekeeping units,3 2 and that density be controlled by restricting
the number of occupants in proportion to habitable floor space.133
The concept of the bona fide single housekeeping unit was
first articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Berger v.
State.134 The court suggested in dictum that communities could
achieve the legitimate goal of "maintaining a peaceful family resi-
dential style of living" by "restrict[ing] single family dwellings to a
reasonable number of persons who constitute a bona fide single
housekeeping unit"135 rather than through restrictive definitions of
family. Without explaining what constitutes a bona fide single
housekeeping unit, the court reasoned that this requirement would
not only promote the qualities associated with single-family areas,
such as permanence and stability, but also would exclude the po-
tentially incompatible uses associated with "boarding houses, dor-
130. Since 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court has heard three cases directly on the
issue: State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979); Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d
993 (1976); and Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513
(1971). Additionally, a number of cases concerning restrictive definitions of "family" have
been heard by the state's lower courts. See, e.g., Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate
City, 112 N.J.. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (1970). In contrast, there is only one California
appellate level decision on this issue, see Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19
Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962), and one federal court decision prior to Adamson, see Palo Alto Te-
nants' Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), af'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
131.- See 27 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545. See also Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 n.7 (1977).
132. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 109, 405 A.2d 368, 372 (1979).
133. Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 254, 281 A.2d 513, 520
(1971).
134. 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976). The controversy in Berger centered on whether
a state home for handicapped children violated the local ordinance's definition of "family."
The court did not directly reach this issue as it found state homes to be immune from local
zoning ordinances. Id. at 218, 281 A.2d at 999.
135. Id. at 225, 364 A.2d at 1002-03. The supreme court actually adopted a suggestion
first set forth by a New Jersey lower court. See Gabe Collins Realty Co. v. City of Margate
City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 350, 271 A.2d 430, 435 (1970).
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mitory and institutional living."138 Further, as the term refers to
the type of use to which a single-family dwelling is put rather than
to the consanguinity of the users, the regulation would avoid the
pitfalls of excessiveness and thus would comply with the require-
ments of substantive due process."'
In the subsequent Baker's3 decision, the New Jersey court re-
iterated its support for the concept of the bona fide single house-
keeping unit as a means of achieving the goals of the ordinance, 139
although it still failed to offer a definition of the term. 4 ' The dis-
sent, however, pointed out that the bona fide single housekeeping
criterion would do little to ensure the low population density of
single-family districts." Rather, standing alone, the requirement
may allow for multifamily occupancy or for an unrestricted num-
ber of unrelated persons living together. 42 The majority disagreed,implying, without further elaboration, that the qualification of
"bona fide" would prevent multifamily occupancy 143 and noting
that municipalities may limit population by requiring a minimum
amount of habitable floor space per occupant.14 4 A restriction of
this nature, applicable to both related and unrelated households, is
more rationally related to a community's legitimate aim of control-
ling population density, reasoned the Baker court, than an ordi-
nance placing a numerical ceiling on the number of individuals
that may live in unrelated households while allowing an un-
restricted number of related persons to occupy a single dwelling. 45
The decision failed to indicate, however, what a reasonable occu-
pant-to-area ratio would be.
New Jersey's twofold approach would appear to resolve many
of the constitutional problems faced by communities in jurisdic-
tions rejecting Belle Terre, including California. By defining "fam-
136. 71 N.J. at 225, 364 A.2d at 1003.
137. Id.
138. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
139. Id. at 108-09, 405 A.2d at 372.
140. "Municipal officials remain free to define in a reasonable manner what consti-
tutes such a unit." Id. at 109 n.3, 405 A.2d at 373.
141. Id. at 115-16, 405 A.2d at 376 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
142. Id. See text accompanying notes 166-70 infra.
143. The dissents objection, stated the majority, "ignores the fact that municipalities
are empowered to restrict residences to groups which actually constitute bona fide single-
housekeeping units-the true criterion of single residence dwellings." 81 N.J. at 109 n.3, 405
A.2d at 372.
144. Id. at 110, 113, 405 A.2d at 373-74.
145. Id.
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ily" as a bona fide single housekeeping unit, an ordinance would
focus on the kind of use to which a dwelling is placed instead of on
the kinship of the users. 146 Occupant-to-area ratios as a means of
density control can be applied to both related and associational
families. Thus, the method does not unfairly affect the rights of
individuals to choose their living companions and does not exclude
living arrangements that "bear the generic character of a family
unit .. in every but a biological sense. ' 14 7
A critical evaluation of New Jersey's twofold approach, how-
ever, raises suspicions regarding its efficacy in maintaining the sin-
gular qualities of single-family zoning, particularly in its ability to
preserve the low density character of these districts. First, the con-
cept of a "bona fide" housekeeping unit has not been given precise
definition. 48 While this problem is not insurmountable and, in
fact, may provide a convenient and unobjectionable means for a
community to control the use to which a dwelling in a single-family
zone is placed,' 49 it will not limit the number of occupants in a
residence, 50 contrary to the Baker majority's assertion. Further-
more, occupant-to-area ratios will not fulfill this objective. Not
only do occupant-to-area ratios present serious problems that the
New Jersey and California courts have overlooked, 15' but, given
the special constitutional protections afforded to families as articu-
lated by Moore, it is unlikely that an occupant-to-area ratio will be
enforced against related households. 52
Single Housekeeping Unit
Although the New Jersey courts have failed to define "single
housekeeping unit," ordinances that do define the term generally
fall into one of three categories. One type of ordinance defines the
term as any number of individuals living and cooking together.53
146. "[Z]oning ordinances are much less suspect when they focus on the use than
when they command inquiry into who are the users." City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27
Cal. 3d 123, 133, 610 P.2d 436, 441-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 544-45 (1980) (emphasis deleted).
147. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305-06, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758-59,
357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 453 (1974).
148. See notes 153-63 & accompanying text infra.
149. See text accompanying notes 164-65 infra.
150. See text accompanying notes 166-70 infra.
151. See notes 171-207 & accompanying text infra.
152. See text accompanying notes 197-202 infra.
153. "A family is one or more individuals living, sleeping, cooking or eating on
premises as a single housekeeping unit." VILLAGE OF WHITEFISH BAY ZONING ORDINANCE
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Another type distinguishes a group living as a single housekeeping
unit from one occupying a boarding house, fraternity, club, or ho-
tel.154 A third type defines the term by emphasizing access to com-
mon areas by all members of the household.155 Each of these defi-
nitions, in its own way, evokes the characteristics associated with a
family life style. Yet the variation in definition has resulted in
courts evaluating the existence of a single housekeeping unit on
the basis of different criteria, leading to disparate results in similar
factual situations.
For example, a Kentucky1 58 and a Connecticut 57 decision both
concerned groups of nurses living in single-family dwellings owned
and operated by their respective hospital employers. In both
households residents had access to kitchen facilities for preparing
snacks, but took their regular meals at the hospitals. The Connect-
icut court held that the group did not constitute a "family" be-
cause they did not cook or eat together as required by the defini-
tion of a single housekeeping unit.158 Conversely, the Kentucky
opinion did not even consider whether the household cooked to-
gether because the local ordinance merely distinguished a single
housekeeping unit "from a group occupying a hotel, club, frater-
nity or sorority house."1 59 Because the household did not fit into
one of the excluded categories, it was deemed to be a single house-
keeping unit.18 0
The purpose underlying an ordinance restricting use of a
§ 14.02(11), cited in Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267
Wis. 608, 611, 66 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1954).
154. "One or more persons occupying the premises as a single housekeeping unit, as
distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house, club, fraternity or
hotel." TowN OF CHESTER ZONING REGULATIONS, art. H1g, cited in Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n of
Chester, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 205, 326 A.2d 841, 845 (C.P. 1974).
155. "Any number of individuals living together as a single housekeeping unit and
using certain rooms and housekeeping facilities in common." TOWNsHIP OF WASHINGTON
ZONING ORDINANCE § 74.2, cited in Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community
Mental Health Center, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 388, 413-14, 383 A.2d 1194, 1206 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1978).
156. Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1954).
157. Prospect Gardens Convalescent Home, Inc. v. City of Norwalk, 32 Conn. Supp.
214, 347 A.2d 637 (C.P. 1975).
158. Id. at 217, 347 A.2d at 639. The ordinance was amended in 1974 to prohibit occu-
pancy by more than five unrelated individuals. At issue was whether 31 nurses living in
three separate dwellings each constituted a single housekeeping unit, thereby qualifying as a
nonconforming use under the amended regulation. See note 34 supra.
159. 267 S.W.2d at 397.
160. Id.
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dwelling to a bona fide single housekeeping unit is to ensure that
such use is compatible with a district characterized by a residential
family style of living. An ordinance requiring that a household live
and cook together may evoke the traditional image of family life.
Regulating the internal activities of the household, however, seems
just as objectionable as legislating the relationship of its members
and has just as little relation to the overall characteristics of a
neighborhood. On the other hand, an ordinance distinguishing a
single housekeeping unit from a hotel or boarding house is obvi-
ously designed to exclude transient uses that would be inconsistent
with the qualities of stability and permanence associated with sin-
gle-family neighborhoods.161 There is a danger, however, in defin-
ing a single housekeeping unit in the negative in that the list of
excluded uses may be incomplete. A court giving strict and literal
construction to the ordinance then may allow an unspecified use of
a dwelling that is essentially incompatible with the district. For
example, a large group of nurses living with a "housemother, '162
not out of a common, voluntary choice to share their household,
but by virtue of their employment, is such an incompatible use,
more reminiscent of a dormitory arrangement than of a family
style of living.
If the concept of a single housekeeping unit is to be character-
ized as a family-style living arrangement, as the state courts con-
sistently hold,63 then arguably the essential underlying quality is
that of unity. Not only are the household expenses and mainte-
nance a matter of common concern to all members of the group,
161. An ordinance of this nature may satisfy the New Jersey standard. Although the
Baker court declined to define "bona fide single housekeeping unit," it decided, without
elaboration, that the household in controversy "was of sufficient permanence so as to resem-
ble a more traditional extended family" and thus constituted a bona fide single housekeep-
ing unit. 81 N.J. at 114, 405 A.2d at 375. "Permanence" and "resemblance to a traditional
family' appear, therefore, to be the criteria to be used in determining the existence of a
single housekeeping unit in New Jersey. However, these adjectives are also open to different
interpretation and application. Compare City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300,
313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1975) (group of college students lacked sufficient perma-
nence to constitute a single housekeeping unit as the members would change each school
year) with Town of Durham v. White Enterprises, 115 N.H. 645, 348 A.2d 706 (1975) ("per-
manence" was not a relevant factor in court's finding that a group of college students consti-
tuted a single housekeeping unit).
162. See Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ky. 1954).
163. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 134-35, 610 P.2d 436, 447-
48, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 550-51 (1980); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 108, 405 A.2d 368, 371
(1979).
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but most importantly the residence itself is used as a whole. It
therefore would seem that the third type of ordinance, which de-
fines a single housekeeping unit in terms of the occupants having
access to all parts of the dwelling, or at least to the common areas,
would be the most reasonable and effective means of restricting
use of single family dwellings. A 1962 California appellate court
decision most clearly articulates this approach."" After defining
"single family dwelling" to refer to use by a group as a single
housekeeping unit rather than by a related household, the court
observed:
"Single family dwelling" designates the joint occupancy and
use of the dwelling by all of those who live there. The word "sin-
gle" precludes the segregation of certain portions or rooms for
rental. It forecloses multiple occupancy of certain portions of the
unit for rental as a segregated part, or parts, of the unit. "Dwell-
ing" means the whole of the premises used for living purposes. It
must include the use of the common rooms, such as the kitchen,
dining room, living room... by all occupants. It refers to and
reinforces, the concept of singular use, as opposed to multiple.
The "dwelling" cannot be fragmentized into broken bits of hous-
ing for rental return. "Family" signifies living as a family; it in-
hibits the breaking up of the premises into segregated units ....
The word refers to the use of the premises as a family. Such
family use, again, would and must be, a single and common use of
the premises.16 5
An ordinance emphasizing use of the entire residence by all
household members would restrict occupancy to unified groups
without encountering the objections raised to the other ap-
proaches. Defining a single housekeeping unit in terms of area ac-
cess is more in keeping with the zoning function of regulating land
use than is defining the concept by reference to the internal activi-
ties of the household.
It therefore would appear that a carefully worded definition of
single housekeeping unit successfully may ensure that certain char-
acteristics associated with single-family zoning are preserved. By
restricting use of single-family dwellings to such living arrange-
ments, a community may have a viable means of excluding com-
mercial, transient, and institutional uses that are incompatible
with the residential quality of the district. This form of use restric-
164. See Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962).
165. Id. at 77, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 247 (emphasis in original).
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tion, however, will not preserve the low population density of a sin-
gle-family area, as the dissent in Baker validly emphasized. 166 Case
history indicates that, once the group in question has been found
to be living as a single housekeeping unit, the courts will consider
the number of the group irrelevant.' As a result, twenty nurses,168
four sisters, their husbands and eight children,"6 " and sixty reli-
gious students1 0 have been found to constitute single housekeep-
ing units.
Regulating Number of Occupants in Relation to Floor
Space
The Baker court suggested that municipalities resolve the
problem of density control by enacting regulations that limit the
number of occupants in relation to habitable floor space.'1 ' Both
the Baker court and the Adamson court reasoned that an ordi-
nance of this nature is more rationally related to a municipality's
legitimate objective of preventing overcrowding than one that lim-
its the number of occupants in unrelated households without plac-
ing a comparable ceiling on the number of individuals in related
households. 1 2 Because of this relationship, the ordinance would
serve to further the public health and would thus constitute a valid
exercise of a community's police power.173
A major problem facing single-family districts, however, is not
merely to prevent an overcrowded environment but to maintain an
uncrowded environment. Space-related standards successfully may
prevent overcrowding, and thus be directly related to the public
health, yet not suffice to maintain the much lower population den-
sity of single-family districts. To illustrate, the American Public
Health Association Model Housing Code recommends that a dwell-
ing unit have a minimum of 150 square feet of habitable floor
16"6. See text accompanying notes 141-42 supra.
167. "The city's legislative body has the right to define the term family. It has done so
placing no limitation on the number of persons constituting a family .... We may not
impose any restrictions not contained in the ordinance." Application of La Porte, 2 A.D.2d
710, 152 N.Y.S.2d 916, 918 (1956).
168. See Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1954).
169. See Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951).
170. Application of La Porte, 2 A.D.2d 710, 152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1956).
171. See text accompanying notes 130-31 supra.
172. See State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 110, 405 A.2d 368, 373 (1979).
173. Id. at 110, 405 A.2d at 373.
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space for the first occupant 174 and 100 square feet for each addi-
tional occupant, a standard cited with apparent approval in several
New Jersey cases.175 The twenty-four room, ten bedroom house in
the Adamson case had 6,231 square feet.176 Applying the American
Public Health Association's figures, sixty-one individuals could oc-
cupy the dwelling without endangering the public health.177 Sixty-
one people residing in a single residence hardly seems to be in
keeping with Justice Douglas's vision of single-family districts in
Belle Terre, a description legitimized as a proper objective of sin-
gle-family zoning even by those jurisdictions disagreeing with Belle
Terre's conclusion:178
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs .... The police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values and the blessings
of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people. 79
Space-related standards also defeat the essential rationale un-
derlying the exclusion of apartment buildings or multifamily dwell-
ings from single-family zoned districts.180 The result of large num-
bers of people residing in a single building is the same, whether it
be a single-family dwelling or an apartment house. Yet, although a
community has the unquestioned right to prohibit structures hous-
ing large numbers of people living in separate units, apparently it
does not have the authority to do so if such individuals are living
as one housekeeping unit and pose no threat to the public
174. See 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 14, § 34.07, at 34-61.
175. See, e.g., Homebuilders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J.
127, 143, 405 A.2d 381, 390 (1979). This opinion also points out that the standard is cur-
rently recommended by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Id.
176. 27 Cal. 3d at 128, 610 P.2d at 438, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
177. This computation assumes that all 6,231 square feet would be classified as "habit-
able" floor space. Typically, "habitable" floor space is defined as "gross floor area less ga-
rages, open patios, basements and unfinished attics." Homebuilders League of S. Jersey, Inc.
v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 137, 405 A.2d 381, 387 (1979). See also Nolden v. East
Cleveland City Comm'n, 12 Ohio Misc. 215, 232 N.E.2d 421 (1966).
178. See, e.g., Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 223, 364 A.2d 993, 1002 (1976); City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452
(1974).
179. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
180. See text accompanying notes 118-20 supra.
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health.18 1
If limiting the number of residents in relation to floor space is
to be effective, the adoption of a lower ratio of occupants to floor
space in single-family districts is required. However, because this
approach would be designed to maintain an uncrowded environ-
ment rather than to prevent an overcrowded one, it logically can-
not be justified in terms of the public health.8 2 As long as density
measures are justified in terms, of the public health, arguably any
departure from the American Public Health Association's recom-
mended standards required to maintain a healthy environment will
arouse the suspicion of the courts. For example, in one New Jersey
case,1as the plaintiff, his wife, and their five children lived in a four
and one-half room apartment of 540 square feet. A town ordinance
mandated a minimum of 150 square feet for each of the first two
occupants and 100 square feet for each additional resident,"8
which meant that the family required an additional 260 square
feet. Although this standard was only slightly higher than that rec-
ommended by the American Public Health Association, 85 the
court raised serious questions in dictum8 " regarding the validity of
181. See text accompanying notes 182-92 infra.
182. For example, a recent decision held an ordinance requiring minimum floor space
in new developments to be invalid if unrelated to other factors such as number of occupants.
The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that different minima were required for various
residential zones. However, as "minima necessary for public health, safety and morals in the
[different] zones are unquestionably the same, it follows that the Township was not consid-
ering health, safety and morals when it enacted these provisions. . . . 'It is ridiculous to
suggest that a 1,100 square foot house may be "healthful" in one part of town and not
another.'" Homebuilders League of S. Jersey v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 143-44, 405
A.2d 381, 390 (1979)(quoting Home Builders League of S. Jersey v. Township of Berlin, 157
N.J. Super. 586, 601, 385 A.2d 295, 302 (1978)). See also Haar, Zoning for Minimum Stan-
dards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1051 (1953); Note, Zoning - Munici-
palities Must Prove that Economically Exclusionary Minimum Floor Area Requirements
Relate to Legitimate Zoning Goals, 11 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 517 (1980).
183. Sente v. Mayor of Clifton, 66 N.J. 204, 330 A.2d 321 (1974).
184. "Every dwelling unit shall contain at least 150 square feet of floor space for each
occupant thereof up to a maximum of two occupants and at least 100 additional square feet
of floor space for every additional occupant thereof. . . ." REVISED ORDINANCE OF CLIF-rON
ch. 9, art. 3, § 9-31(a), cited in Sente v. Mayor of Clifton, 66 N.J. 204, 212-13, 330 A.2d 321,
325 (1974).
185. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
186. 66 N.J. at 206, 330 A.2d at 322-23. The plaintiff and his family resided in the
apartment as partial compensation for his employment as building superintendent. By the
time the case was heard on appeal, the plaintiff had moved. The civil liberties organization
which carried on in the plaintiff's name was deemed not to have standing and the contro-
versy was considered moot.
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the ratio. Although assuming that a community "may legitimately
require a minimum floor area for living units based on the number
and character of the occupants in the interest of the public
health, 1 87 the majority concluded that the real issue was whether
the prescribed minimum was reasonable, "and if so, whether the
regulation was actually adopted for health reasons. ' " Because an
ordinance of this kind drastically affects the availability of hous-
ing, particularly for large or poor families, the court wondered
whether a municipality should not be required to demonstrate that
the ratio actually prevents a substantial health hazard and is not
merely a form of exclusionary zoning.189
The Baker court cited the foregoing decision in support of its
conclusion that occupant-to-area ratios provide a more rational
means of controlling density than do restrictive definitions of fam-
ily.190 Yet the cited opinion evidenced strong doubts regarding the
validity of a standard almost identical to that of the Model Hous-
ing Code, leading one to suspect that the legality of any such mea-
sure will be justified only upon the strongest showing of a public
health problem. 1 Further, if the court was hesitant to uphold an
ordinance requiring 800 square feet for seven persons, it is doubt-
ful that a higher standard sufficient to maintain a low-density en-
vironment would be found valid. In light of New Jersey's inconsis-
tency in advocating space-related restrictions while reviewing them
with great wariness, one wonders whether the preservation of low-
density districts truly remains a valid and viable objective of sin-
187. Id. at 208, 330 A.2d at 323.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 208-09, 330 A.2d at 323. Exclusionary zoning has been defined as "zoning
that raises the price of residential access to a particular area, and thereby denies that access
to members of low income groups." Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
190. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 110, 405 A.2d 368, 373 (1979).
191. In a recent California appellate decision, the court admitted that the communal
households in question were overcrowded. City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d
785, 789, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738, 742 (1981). While it suggested that occupant-to-area ratios may
prevent such problems, the court noted that the Moore decision may preclude enforcement
of such methods against related families while the Adamson decision precluded enactment
of such ordinances aimed only at unrelated individuals. Id. at 798-99, 171 Cal. Rptr. 746.
See also text accompanying notes 197-207 infra. The court suggested that a nuisance action
may be brought against an overcrowded household as an alternative method of coping with
this problem. 115 Cal. App. 3d at 800-01, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 747. Nuisance actions were the
original method of land use control. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 16, § 3.03, at 76.9. Adopt-
ing the court's approach would essentially mean that land use regulation has come full
circle.
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gle-family zoning in those states rejecting Belle Terre. Unless the
courts are willing to recognize this objective, any ratio of occupants
to floor space sufficient to maintain the low density nature of a
single-family area will be struck down.192
Judicial concern regarding exclusionary motives is not unwar-
ranted; the cases have proven otherwise. 19 It is reasonable, how-
ever, for density controls to be considered in light of a municipal-
ity's total zoning plan rather than on an isolated basis. Should a
community enact a low density ratio on a general basis, the mo-
tives would indeed be suspect. Suspicion may be alleviated, how-
ever, by using a low ratio applicable only to single-family districts
coupled with an increase in the standard that is correlated to in-
tensity of zoned uses. 1 4 Of course, this variable ratio could survive
judicial scrutiny only if it is accepted that the purpose is to main-
tain a low-density environment and not simply to prevent an over-
crowding that directly threatens the public health.
An alternative solution may lie in the method by which the
ratio of occupants to floor space is computed. Rather than using
the total habitable square footage of a residence, the area of the
common rooms could be discounted, leaving only the bedroom and
bathroom areas to serve as a basis. 95 This method would be in line
192. To date, only one other state court has confronted the issue. In that case, the
minimum standards were identical to those recommended by the Model Housing Code. An
Ohio court upheld the regulation as a valid means to prevent overcrowding and considered
it rationally related to the public health. Nolden v. City of East Cleveland, 12 Ohio Misc.
205, 232 N.E.2d 421 (1966). Paradoxically, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Sente seems to
cite Nolden with begrudging approval, noting that it had certain "ameliorating aspects"
lacking in Clifton's ordinance. Sente v. Mayor of Clifton, 66 N.J. 204, 207, 330 A.2d 321, 322
(1974). However, the tone of the Sente opinion indicates that the reasonableness of the
standard would be critically examined even in a modified regulation.
193. See, e.g., Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). See generally, McDougal,
Contemporary Authoritative Conceptions of Federalism and Exclusionary Land Use Plan-
ning, 21 B.C.L. REv. 301 (1980).
194. One community has enacted this type of ordinance. Section 140 of the Durham,
New Hampshire Zoning Ordinance allows for one occupant per 300 square feet in single
detached dwellings, duplexes, and townhouses; 1.5 occupants per 300 square feet in apart-
ments; 2 residents per 300 square feet in boarding houses; and 3 occupants per 300 square
feet in dormitories. The restriction applies only to unrelated persons. See Town of Durham
v. White Enterprises, 115 N.H. 645, 648, 348 A.2d 706, 708 (1975).
195. A New Jersey court cursorily suggested this as a possible method of limiting pop-
ulation. See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 254, 281 A.2d 513,
520 (1971). The United States Department of Housing and Urban Affairs also has proposed
a similar plan in which the number of permitted occupants in a residence is based on the
number of bedrooms in a dwelling. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVWLOPmENT, Hous-
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with defining single housekeeping unit in terms of access by all
members to common areas.196 If all occupants have such access,
then it is only the amount of the individual living space that is of
import.
Impact of Moore on Occupant-to-Area Ratio Method of Density
Control
Even if the courts were to acknowledge the validity of a den-
sity ratio designed to maintain the low population character of a
single-family district, it is doubtful whether such an ordinance
constitutionally could be enforced against a related household.197
As noted, Moore v. City of East Cleveland195 extended constitu-
tional protection to choices of the family concerning its living ar-
rangements.199 By so doing, it has prohibited any zoning regulation
that will impact on such decisions. 00 An occupant-to-area ratio ap-
plicable to both related and unrelated households alike would not
be aimed directly at interfering with the choice of families to de-
termine their living arrangements, as was East Cleveland's ordi-
nance. An area-related standard, however, could affect indirectly
such choices by preventing family members in excess of the ap-
proved ratio from residing with their relatives.
In advocating occupant-to-area ratios, the Baker court rea-
soned that such a restriction, applicable to all households, was re-
lated more rationally to density control than were restrictive defi-
nitions of family.201 Yet if such measures cannot be enforced
against related households, as seems likely in view of Moore, then
the enactment of such measures would be tantamount to the en-
actment of restrictive definitions of family and would resurrect the
same problems and objections.202
ING MANAGEMENT MANUAL, No. 4351.1 (Oct. 15, 1974), cited in City of Chula Vista v.
Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 797 n.3, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738, 745 (1981).
196. See note 142 & text accompanying notes 154-56 supra.
197. See City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738
(1981).
198. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
199. Id. at 500.
200. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
201. 81 N.J. at 110, 113, 405 A.2d at 373, 374.
202. See, e.g., Town of Durham v. White, 115 N.H. 645, 348 A.2d 706 (1975).
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Validity of Occupant-to-Floor-Space Ratio in California
The Adamson court approved the occupant-to-floor-space ra-
tio method of density control advocated by New Jersey's supreme
court.20 3 Because the method would apply equally to both related
and unrelated households, the court implied that it would not un-
reasonably burden the privacy rights of unrelated persons to form
a household.0 4 Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, however, the
California court failed to take into consideration Moore's impact
on this form of density control. Additionally, it did not consider
the complications created by its holding that the choice of living
companions is a fundamental right.2 05 A community may restrict
this fundamental right only by showing a compelling state interest
and by demonstrating that the means used is necessary to further
that interest.20 6 Therefore, if an occupant-to-area ratio sufficient to
maintain a low density environment is to be valid, the California
court must acknowledge that a community's goal to preserve an
uncrowded district is a compelling state interest and that an occu-
pant-to-area ratio is a necessary method of effectuating that inter-
est. Yet the California Supreme Court discussed density control, as
did the New Jersey court, in terms of preventing overcrowding,207
thus indicating that the state's judiciary will be hesitant to find the
state's interest in low-density residential districts to be compelling.
Therefore, a space-related approach would be a less viable means
of achieving the aims of single-family zoning in California than in a
jurisdiction invalidating restrictive definitions of family using the
lesser standard of substantive due process.
Conditional Use Permit as an Alternative
At least two communities have enacted ordinances requiring
groups of unrelated individuals in excess of the ordinances' regula-
tory definitions of "family" to obtain a conditional use permit
203. 27 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
204. Id. at 132-34, 610 P.2d at 441-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
205. Id. at 134, 610 P.2d at 442, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
206. See note 13 supra.
207. "Regarding 'low density' . the ordinance limits only the number of unrelated
residents. It does not limit the number of related residents, or of servants. It does not ap-
pear to have been designed to prevent overcrowding which may be a legitimate zoning goal"
27 Cal. 3d at 132, 610 P.2d at 441, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 544. This excerpt from the court's




prior to residing together. 20 This technique arguably meets sub-
stantive due process objections in that unrelated persons are not
automatically prohibited from residing together by virtue of house-
hold size. By requiring a group of unrelated individuals who desire
to reside together in a single-family residential district to apply for
a conditional use permit, a municipality can determine whether
the group meets the definitional requirements of a bona fide single
housekeeping unit and, more importantly, whether the number of
occupants reasonably relates to the size of the dwelling. The mu-
nicipality thereby can ensure that the density level of an area, and
consequently the infrastructure, would not be adversely affected.
Of course, the validity of such a determination is dependent upon
the standards used by the community in evaluating an unrelated
group. Because the issuance of a conditional use permit is a discre-
tionary matter, objective criteria are essential to prevent arbitrary
denial of the license. Yet in formulating the standards, a commu-
nity should be free to take into consideration any particular
problems it faces in providing adequate services and facilities.209
While the conditional use permit may be feasible in other
states, Adamson's reliance on a fundamental rights theory has pre-
cluded its use in California. The court in City of Chula Vista v.
Pagard,21 0 the first California appellate level decision to interpret
and apply Adamson, invalidated Chula Vista's ordinance requiring
unrelated groups to obtain a conditional use permit.2 11 The court
admitted that the system was related to overcrowding, was a less
restrictive means of achieving the community's goals than are defi-
nitions of family based on consanguinity, and was "relevant and
rationally related to [the] control of noise, traffic and parking con-
gestion.121 2 Because the ordinance was aimed only at unrelated
households, however, the court found that it suffered the same de-
208. MENLO PARK MUN. CODE ch. 1681, § 16.81,010 (1980) provides: "Family-Non-
Conforming. A group of persons, not otherwise qualified or defined as a 'family' under the
terms of this title, may nonetheless be permitted to reside in a single family dwelling or in a
single living unit in any residential zone provided, however, that the said use shall require a
use permit." See also CITY OF CHULA VISTA MUN. ORDINANCE § 19.04.105 cited in City of
Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981).
209. See, e.g., City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738
(1981).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 796, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
212. Id. at 795, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 744. The court's statement suggests that the condi-
tional use permit approach would satisfy substantive due process requirements.
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ficiencies inherent in restrictive definitions of "family" and there-
fore failed to meet constitutional muster under Adamson. 13 Most
importantly, the court pointed out that requiring an unrelated
household to be licensed essentially subjects the household mem-
bers' exercise of their fundamental right to privacy to the discre-
tion of the community's planning commission.2 14 This fact in itself
should have been of sufficient weight for the court to have found
the ordinance unconstitutional under the standards imposed by
Adamson.
Conclusion
In striking down restrictive definitions of family, the Baker
court commented that, "despite the inexactitude and overinclu-
siveness of such regulations, we would be reluctant to condemn
them in the absence of less restrictive alternatives. Such options
do, however, exist."21 5 In one sense the comment is valid. A care-
fully drafted definition of a bona fide single housekeeping unit suc-
cessfully may restrict the use of a single-family dwelling to one
which is compatible with a "family style of living" without unduly
affecting the rights of unrelated individuals to form a household.
However, it is apparent that density control remains the primary
problem facing municipalities.
If low population districts dedicated to "family values and
needs" are to remain a viable zoning objective, the judiciary must
recognize that preventing overcrowding and maintaining low den-
sity are two entirely separate goals. If such districts are to remain a
legitimate zoning objective, the courts must be willing to accept
rationales for their existence that are not rooted in public health
arguments.216
With such acknowledgment, it may be possible for communi-
ties outside of California to formulate density control methods that
will preserve single-family districts. The conditional use permit
213. Id. at 795-96, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 744-45.
214. Id. at 796, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
215. 81 N.J. at 108, 405 A.2d at 372.
216. Arguably, the Supreme Court has provided sufficient authority to support zoning
for low density with its legitimizing of "community character" as a valid objective in zoning
laws. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See generally Jensen, From Belle Terre to East Cleveland:
Zoning, the Family and the Right to Privacy, 13 FAM. L.Q. 1, 4-5 (1979); Developments in
the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 1441-57 (1978).
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technique may be such a method, for the rights of unrelated indi-
viduals can be balanced against the problems faced by municipali-
ties. In California, however, the Adamson court's well-intentioned
but inappropriate reliance on the fundamental rights theory very
well may have precluded enactment of any viable means of pre-
serving low-density districts.217
217. "Between the federal Scylla as defined in Moore v. East Cleveland ... and the
State of California's Charybdis as exemplified in the Adamson ... decision, few options
would appear to remain open to the city desiring to retain and promote 'family values' and
'family needs."' City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 798, 171 Cal. Rptr.
738, 746 (1981).
SINGLE-FAMILY ZONINGJuly 19811

